

HOPE for Probation: How Hawaii Improved Behavior with High-Probability, Low-Severity Sanctions

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Abstract

Inflation-adjusted spending on corrections in the United States has more than doubled over the past two decades. Concern over the cost of corrections has forced policy makers to consider alternatives to incarceration for drug offenders and make efforts to improve the performance of community supervision. The challenge is to find ways to keep drug offenders out of jail and prison without compromising public safety. Hawaii has achieved this goal, using an innovative low-cost approach that dramatically improves probationer compliance and reduces drug use and crime. The program is called Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement, known as HOPE.

This paper describes HOPE and documents interviews with two individuals responsible for putting HOPE into practice: Judge Steven S. Alm, creator of HOPE, and Cheryl Inouye, supervisor of the probation unit that managed the first HOPE caseloads.

Introduction

Inflation-adjusted spending on corrections in the United States has more than doubled over the past two decades.⁽¹⁾ Concern over the cost of corrections has forced policy makers to consider alternatives to incarceration for drug offenders and make efforts to improve the performance of community supervision. Many states have introduced treatment-diversion programs, which give drug offenders the option of community-based treatment rather than serving jail or prison time. These programs, however, have done little to improve probation and parole outcomes.⁽¹⁾ The challenge is to find ways to keep drug offenders out of jail and prison without compromising public safety. Hawaii has achieved this goal, using an innovative low-cost approach that dramatically improves probationer compliance and reduces drug use and crime. The program is called Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement, known as HOPE. HOPE started as a small pilot program in 2004 but has since been expanded because of the impressive improvements in probationer compliance under the program. Today, nearly one-in-five felony probationers on Oahu are supervised under HOPE. This paper describes HOPE and documents interviews with two individuals responsible for putting HOPE into practice: Judge Steven S. Alm, creator of HOPE, and Cheryl Inouye, supervisor of the probation unit that managed the first HOPE caseloads.

Background

Community supervision is intended to be an alternative to incarceration: Instead of serving a prison or jail term, an offender promises to comply with a set of probation or parole conditions, and an officer is assigned to enforce these conditions with authority to report violations to the court or parole board for possible sanctions. This should be a win-win. For taxpayers, it avoids the costs of incarceration, and for offenders, it permits them to live lawfully in their home community. But community supervision has a poor track record. Large percentages of offenders fail to complete their terms of supervision, and recidivism is high; about two-thirds of prisoners are rearrested on a new crime within three years of release.^(2,3)

Why is community supervision so ineffective in most jurisdictions? There are many reasons. Probation and parole officers manage large caseloads, which makes it difficult to reliably monitor compliance with terms of supervision. Most police agencies give low priority to serving bench warrants for probation absconders, making it difficult to actually enforce the terms of probation and parole. The sanctions process is time consuming, puts large demands on probation officers, and often leads to no action. As a result, many probation officers attempt to cajole probationers into improving their behavior rather than taking formal action to impose sanctions. And there is not nearly enough emphasis on managing drug use.

Even though drug offenders are at high risk for continued drug and alcohol abuse, they are drug tested too infrequently, and sanctions for continued drug use are too rarely delivered to produce behavior change. As a result, noncompliance is high. When sanctions for noncompliance are made, they tend to be too severe (months, sometimes even years, in jail or prison), which defeats the rationale for probation as a less costly alternative to incarceration.

HOPE provides evidence that re-engineering the probation-enforcement process can improve compliance with all types of probation conditions, including desistance from drug use, among even heavily drug-involved probationers.⁽⁴⁾ And it achieves these results at a relatively low cost.

How HOPE works

High-risk probationers are assigned to HOPE. HOPE probationers have long histories of drug use and

involvement with the criminal-justice system (they have an average of 17 prior arrests). Probationers are referred to HOPE if their probation officer or a judge believes they face a high risk of failing probation and being returned to prison. HOPE begins with a formal warning, delivered by a judge or hearings officer in court, that any violation of probation conditions will not be tolerated: Each violation will result in an immediate, brief jail stay. Probationers with substance-abuse issues are assigned a color code at the warning hearing. The probationer is required to call the HOPE hotline each weekday morning. Those probationers whose color is selected must appear at the probation office before 2 pm that day for a drug test. During their first two months in HOPE, probationers are randomly tested at least six times per month (good behavior through compliance and negative drug tests is rewarded with an assignment of a new color associated with less-regular testing). If a probationer fails to appear for testing, a bench warrant is issued immediately and is served by the Honolulu Police Department. The sanctioning process happens quickly. Probationers who test positive for drug use or fail to appear for probation appointments are arrested and held in custody. As soon as the violation is detected, the probation officer completes a "Motion to Modify Probation" form and sends it to the judge (the Motion to Modify form was designed to be much simpler than a Motion to Revoke Probation and can be completed very quickly). The hearing on the Motion to Modify is held promptly (most are held within 72 hours), with the probationer confined in the interim. Unlike a probation revocation, a modification order does not sever the probation relationship. A probationer found to have violated the terms of probation is immediately sentenced to a short jail stay (typically several days servable on the weekend if employed, but increasing with continued non-compliance), with credit given for time served. The probationer resumes participation in HOPE and reports to his or her probation officer on the day of release. If a positive drug-test result is disputed, the probationer is released pending confirmation testing and given a court date for one week later. These probationers are warned that their jail sanction will be enhanced if drug use is confirmed.

A probationer may request a treatment referral at any time, but probationers with multiple violations are mandated to intensive substance abuse treatment services (typically residential care). The court continues to supervise the probationer throughout the treatment experience and consistently sanctions noncompliance (positive drug tests and no-shows for treatment or probation appointments).

Theoretical underpinnings of HOPE

The combination of testing and sanctions as implemented under HOPE has a strong theoretical foundation that is research based:

1. A clearly defined behavioral contract

Clearly defined behavioral contracts enhance the perceived certainty of punishment, which improves compliance.(7,8,9,10) Probationers in HOPE are informed about the conditions for compliance with the terms of their probation and the consequences for any violation are carefully laid out.

2. Sanctions are delivered consistently

The consistent application of rules of a behavioral contract improves compliance and enhances perceptions of fairness.(7) Probationers in HOPE are monitored closely, and every detected violation is sanctioned.

3. Sanctions are swift

A swift response to infractions improves the perception that the sanction is fair.(7,11). And the immediacy of a sanction helps shape behavior.(12) HOPE probationers are arrested immediately when a violation is detected and are taken before a judge.

4. Sanctions are parsimonious

Parsimonious use of punishment (ideally, the least punishment necessary to bring about the desired behavior change) improves the perceived legitimacy of the sanction and reduces the potential negative impacts of longer jail sentences.(13)

5. Awareness of dignity (also called "procedural justice")

The supervision process itself affects compliance.(7) Probationers who are managed fairly and respectfully show improved compliance. (14,15,16) Probation officers in Hawaii are well trained in motivational interviewing and cognitive-behavioral therapy. Both the supervising judges and the probation officers make it clear that they want the probationer to succeed.

Testing and Sanctions in Practice

Prior to HOPE, the strongest evidence for testing and sanctions came from the Washington, D.C. Drug Court Experiment conducted in 1993. The purpose of this experiment was to evaluate the role of treatment and sanctions in deterring drug use among drug offenders.(5) Subjects in the randomized controlled trial were assigned to one of three dockets: Docket 1 (the standard docket) received the normal process of drug testing and judicial monitoring with no sanctions for failed drug tests; Docket 2 (the treatment docket) was assigned to intensive treatment; and Docket 3 (the sanctions docket) received immediate sanctions (the graduated sanctions package began with three days in a jury box, then to three days in jail, then 5–7 days in detoxification, then 7 days in jail) for failed drug tests or missed appointments, with treatment

provided if needed or desired. The study showed that the sanctions docket was the most effective for reducing drug use and recidivism (and was much less costly than the treatment docket).

Despite the strong theoretical underpinnings of testing-and-sanctions programs and the experimental evidence provided by the Washington, D.C. Drug Court Experiment, there have been relatively few instances of widespread testing-and-sanctions programs implemented in practice. The success of the programs that have been implemented seems to be correlated with how reliably the conditions of probation are enforced.⁽⁶⁾ The credibility of these programs is key. Idle threats are not sufficient to motivate behavior change, and programs that have failed to deliver on their threats have performed poorly. But delivering on threats is no small task. HOPE is a rare example of a jurisdiction that managed to reconfigure its probation system to swiftly and credibly make good on its promises.

How has HOPE performed?

The Hawaii Office of the Attorney General has collected statistics to track the performance of HOPE since the program started in 2004. Early research reported by the Attorney General's office showed impressive improvement in outcomes for probationers who were supervised under HOPE. These early findings attracted the attention of criminal justice researchers and the U.S. Department of Justice. There have now been two formal evaluations of HOPE in two probation offices: a quasi-experimental study to compare HOPE probationers to a similar group of comparison probationers and a true intent-to-treat randomized controlled trial to compare HOPE to probation as usual.⁽⁴⁾

The Integrated Community Sanctions Unit (Honolulu's intensive-supervision high-risk probation unit) was the first unit to pilot a HOPE program. The rate of positive drug tests fell by 93 percent for HOPE probationers during the first six months (from 53 percent to 4 percent), compared with 14 percent for comparison probationers (from 22 percent to 19 percent). These improvements in probationer behavior translated into other benefits. Recidivism fell sharply, as did arrests (arrests were more than halved), revocations, and incarceration (an average of 130 prison days were saved per probationer). Findings then were later replicated with a randomized controlled trial of high-risk, primarily methamphetamine-using probationers in a general probation unit.

Interviews with the key players responsible for implementing HOPE show that the program is held in high regard.⁽⁴⁾ We found positive general perceptions of HOPE, with the highest levels of satisfaction reported by judges and probation officers. A sizable majority (95 percent) of probation officers reported that they were able to manage their caseloads more effectively under HOPE, and they were unanimous in their assessment that their HOPE cases improved once placed on HOPE.

HOPE probationers remain under court supervision while in treatment. Once a HOPE client is referred to treatment, it is not sufficient that he/she merely appear for treatment; the client has to abstain from drug use to avoid a jail sanction. This positions the treatment provider as an ally in the client's efforts to avoid sanctioning. HOPE treatment providers in Hawaii remark that they prefer clients who are supervised under HOPE as they are easier to work with. Indeed, Hawaii's treatment providers are among the strongest supporters of HOPE.

And what about the probationers? Among the more surprising results from the HOPE evaluation was how strongly the HOPE probationers support the program. Figure 1 describes the perceptions of HOPE probationers under active supervision in the community, in treatment, and in jail.⁽¹⁹⁾ Even the probationers who were surveyed while serving a jail sanction under HOPE reported overwhelmingly positive perceptions of the program. In open-ended questions probationers remarked that they appreciated that the program is fair.⁽¹⁹⁾

[Figure 1](#)

HOPE as "Behavioral Triage"

HOPE identified a small minority of probationers who were unwilling or unable to desist from drug use under sanctions pressure alone. Only 40 percent of HOPE probationers had any post-warning violation (i.e., positive drug test) within the first year; of those who had one violation, only half had a second violation; of those with two violations, only half (10 percent of the total) had a third or subsequent violation. I refer to this as the "behavioral triage" function of HOPE - the program identifies those most in need of treatment by observing their actual conduct.⁽¹⁷⁾ This approach has intuitive appeal, but it is not how treatment services are delivered in practice.

The standard approach used by drug courts and treatment-diversion programs is to mandate every offender to receive drug treatment (even those without diagnosable substance-abuse disorders) and then base treatment decisions on self-reported behavior. Under HOPE, an offender is subjected to regular random drug testing with the threat of an immediate, though relatively mild, sanction if they test positive for drug use. This allows treatment decisions to be gauged to an offender's observed behavior rather than through self-reporting.

An "assess-and-treat" model that relies on self-reported behavior is a poor approach to managing criminal justice-involved clients. Criminal offenders are well aware that their self-reported drug use can influence their sentences and the types of treatment to which they will be referred. They have a clear incentive to manipulate their self-report in pursuit of a desired outcome. The not-so-surprising observation is that, quite often, offenders lie.

In our survey of 211 drug-involved offenders under community supervision in Hawaii, 48 percent reported willfully exaggerating their drug use on a prior assessment to secure a referral to treatment to avoid jail time, and 53 percent reported willfully underreporting their drug use on a prior assessment to avoid a treatment referral.(17) Similar mismatches between self-report and actual drug use have been found in other offender research that compared self-reported drug use to drug use measured from hair assays. Of those whose hair tested positive for cocaine use in the past 90 days, 43% had denied any drug use during the previous year. (18) Over-reliance on self-reports means that offenders will be misclassified and treatment resources will likely be misallocated.

By contrast, under a Behavioral Triage Model (such as HOPE) an offender's observed behavior signals their need for treatment services. Those who can desist from using drugs on their own should not be forced into formal treatment. This allows treatment resources to be used more strategically by providing high-quality, longer-term care to those probationers whose behavior has indicated they are most in need of intensive services.

Implications of HOPE

HOPE has demonstrated that community supervision can be a meaningful alternative to incarceration. HOPE is receiving a great deal of attention from national media and policy makers because of the improvements in probationer behavior observed, but many questions remain. Implementing a HOPE-style program that delivers swift-and-certain sanctions requires a great deal of cooperation across multiple agencies and a willingness to change work practices. Whether HOPE can be implemented with fidelity in other jurisdictions remains an open question. A number of replication studies of HOPE are underway, including HOPE-style models in Alaska, Nevada, Arizona, Oregon, and California. These replications will determine whether Hawaii's HOPE experience is generalizable to the mainland and whether HOPE merits designation as an evidence-based practice.

HOPE and Behavioral Triage represent an important new approach to probation operations and have important implications for probation management, for treatment resource allocation, and for correctional decision-making more generally. The existing findings on HOPE are cause for optimism. The HOPE evaluations have shown that even offenders with long histories of heavy methamphetamine use can and will modify their behavior when faced with high-probability sanctions. (20) It now remains to be seen if other jurisdictions can reorganize their criminal-justice systems to deliver on credible threats.

Interview with Judge Steven S. Alm

Felony Trial Judge, First Circuit Court, Honolulu Hawaii

Q. Judge Alm, how did the idea for HOPE Probation come about?

A. In June of 2004, I was assigned to a felony trial docket. From that first week, I would receive Motions to Revoke Probation often with 10, 20, or 30 or more probation violations. The probation officer was returning the offender back to court with a nearly universal recommendation that I sentence the probationer to the underlying 5, 10, or 20 years in prison. I thought that this system was broken and was the wrong way to try to change anybody's behavior.

Q. So what was the alternative?

A. Well, I thought to myself, what changes a person's behavior? Swift and certain consequences for misbehavior. I thought about how I had raised my son. If he misbehaved, I would talk to him about what he had done wrong and warned him that he shouldn't do it again. Then, if he did it again, I would give him a swift and sure, but proportionate, punishment for breaking the rules. That way, he would learn from his mistake. I thought that it made sense to apply that thinking to the probation system.

Q. Adult Probation is a large and cumbersome system in any state, including many agencies in different branches of government. How did you go about trying to change the system?

A. First, I looked at the relevant statutes and thought about the roles of the different agencies involved. I then spoke to a committed and gifted probation supervisor, Cheryl Inouye. She headed up the Integrated Community Sanctions Section, responsible for monitoring high-risk probationers, including sex offenders and others convicted of a variety of felonies (e.g., burglaries, assaults, drugs) who had failed at drug treatment or refused to participate and who were still using drugs. Ms. Inouye was great. She was willing to try something new and help the offenders by bringing more accountability to the system.

Q. Was anybody else involved in the planning?

A. I then invited a prosecutor supervisor and the State public defender to the table. I explained that we wanted to bring swift and certain, but proportionate, consequences for all probation violations. They both agreed that what we were doing wasn't working for many offenders and were willing to try something new. The prosecutor supervisor agreed to design a new, fill-in-the-blanks Motion to Modify Probation (i.e., with a short time in jail, then out to see the probation officer). The public defender, noting that the rules were going to be the same but we were actually going to enforce them for the first time, asked if we could warn his clients of the new procedures. That made sense to me.

I spoke to the jail to advise them of the small project we were starting, talked with the Sheriff about the probation program, and asked for their help in taking these violators into custody if they tested positive for drugs at the probation office or turned themselves in when a warrant was outstanding.

I also realized that warrant service was not always a high law enforcement priority. Drawing on my years as the United States Attorney (chief federal prosecutor) here in Hawaii, I asked the head of Hawaii's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program (HIDTA) if they would assist. He agreed and spoke to the United States Marshal. As a result, the Marshal agreed to have his Federal Fugitive Task Force serve the warrants for my court for this project, and HIDTA would pay any task force overtime.

Q. How many offenders are in HOPE Probation?

A. We started with 34 offenders at the Warning hearing on 10/1/04. We currently have more than 1,700 offenders in HOPE. More than 1,500 are felons (out of 8,200 offenders on felony probation or deferral on this island), plus another 200 or so domestic violence misdemeanants.

Q. This sounds like it's a real team effort? Is it?

A. It certainly is. I am so proud of all these public employees who were willing to work a little smarter, harder, and faster to create and operate a new system. This includes probation officers, court staff, judges, prosecutors, the defense, sheriffs, corrections, and treatment providers. All involved here have made good suggestions to make HOPE Probation work better.

Q. Speaking of treatment providers, how do they seem to like HOPE Probation?

A. They fully support HOPE. Alan Johnson, CEO of Hina Mauka, Honolulu's largest substance abuse program, and Chair of the Hawaii Substance Abuse Coalition (HSAC) has said that HOPE probationers are more responsive to treatment than non-HOPE probationers. HOPE probationers are more engaged in treatment which provides improved outcomes. The providers acknowledge that treatment and HOPE provide better outcomes than treatment alone.

Q. How did the name HOPE come about?

A. I had a contest among the court staff and probation officers to name the program. An early tongue-in-cheek entry was Yank and Spank. When Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement was suggested, I knew we had a winner.

Q. You have referred to HOPE as being "swift, certain and proportionate." Why is "proportionate" important?

A. Probationers have told the researchers that they feel they are being treated fairly in HOPE. They are told what the rules are and what the consequences will be if they violate; e.g., for missing a probation appointment but turning themselves in, they are sanctioned for a few days or a week. They feel like they are being punished, but it's for a bad choice they made and that the punishment fits the crime. If the offenders believe the system is fair, they are much more likely to buy into it and be successful.

Q. HOPE sounds like it's going well in Hawaii. Are other jurisdictions looking at HOPE?

A. Yes. There has been a lot of interest from all across the country. Alaska, Nevada, Oregon, and Arizona have recently started their HOPE-type efforts, and California and Virginia are getting organized. At the end of 2009, federal legislation was introduced to set up 20 HOPE pilots around the country, and there have been a number of hearings on HOPE before Congress in 2010.

Q. What is the future of HOPE?

A. Great! I believe HOPE is that rarest of strategies in the criminal justice system - a true win-win proposition. HOPE reduces crime and victimization; it helps offenders and their families by keeping them employed and out of prison; and it saves taxpayers millions of dollars.

Interview with Ms. Cheryl Inouye

Probation Supervisor, Integrated Community Sanctions Section, Honolulu, Hawaii

Q. Ms. Inouye, how and when did you first get involved with HOPE Probation?

A. In 2004, Judge Alm called and presented this idea of taking swift and certain sanctions for probation violations involving drug and alcohol use. He asked if I might be interested in working with him on this, and I said absolutely.

Q. What did you think of the HOPE concept at first?

A. I didn't have to think twice about it, although I did feel Judge Alm would have to work miracles to make it happen. This was just not the way the courts, including probation, did business, so I admit I wasn't entirely convinced at first that this would work.

It was exciting to be approached by a judge who understood the issues and challenges probation officers (POs) face in carrying out our mandate of rehabilitating offenders. As skilled as POs are in identifying risk factors and intervention techniques and strategies, such as motivational interviewing and cognitive behavioral therapy, we saw little evidence of change. Probation officers genuinely care about improving the lives of others, and I was confident I could count on this fact to get them to give HOPE a chance.

Q. How did it change the way your probation officers did their jobs?

A. To really appreciate the changes, you need to picture how it used to be. POs would manage their probationers as they lived in the community for as long as possible, using whatever intermediate sanctions were available at their disposal, until the PO felt the risk to the public or the severity of violations warranted the revocation of probation. The PO would then start the laborious process of completing an affidavit, violation report, and recommendation letter, then attend and testify in court, only to have the case frequently returned for a new term of probation. The time between violations and the court hearing could extend well over several years. When imprisonment was ordered, offenders faced five-, ten- and 20-year terms.

Under HOPE, POs immediately respond to a violation by completing a check-listed motion for modification, arrest the offender on-site, and arrange to have the hearing that day or soon thereafter. The violation report and recommendation are sent to the judge by an email template. The time between violation and court hearing is generally no more than two days, and confinement is brief and immediate.

The difference has been tremendous with HOPE. The PO is able to spend less time on the sanctioning process and spend more time with the client on his/her rehabilitation.

Q. Don't the HOPE Probation procedures cause your probation officers to lose discretion? If so, how do you and your officers feel about that?

A. Yes, POs do lose discretion in some ways, but there are advantages to this. The clients are warned about the consequences of violating probation in a group so they know each client will be treated in the same way depending on the violation. Prior to HOPE, clients were more likely to regard a PO's recommended sanctions personally since violations were handled differently among the POs. The line at which revocation would be initiated was left to the PO's discretion. Often, clients would request a change in POs, believing their PO was stricter than others.

The POs do maintain discretion in their recommendations to the judge for how severe the sanctioning should be once the client has been arrested. For some clients, the mere fact of being immediately arrested could have the same impact as serving time in jail. POs take into consideration the individual and his/her situation and recommend sanctions accordingly.

Q. What share of your officers' caseloads is now in HOPE?

A. Nearly all of the clients in this section are in HOPE (over 1,000).

Q. Six years into HOPE, how do you and your officers feel about HOPE, and how does it compare to probation-as-usual?

A. The POs prefer HOPE to non-HOPE cases as it increases their efficacy as change agents. To effect changes in behavior, offenders need to see there are distinct disadvantages to maintaining the status quo. The experience and consequences of losing their liberty and seeing the impact on others who are meaningful to them help to provide the reason or need to change. Sobriety provides them the opportunity to experience the benefits of change, and we're hoping these benefits will reinforce the internal motivation to sustain the change after probation expires.

HOPE has not only improved offender accountability but has enhanced the credibility and accountability of probation in serving in the interests of community safety.

Q. How do the offenders you supervise feel about HOPE?

A. Based on what the POs tell me, at the onset, offenders are not likely to appreciate HOPE because the HOPE requirements -- such as the daily call-ins, frequent and random drug testing, and quick arrest and immediate, though often short term, jail time -- does interrupt, and sometimes disrupts, their lives. It's usually only after overcoming their addiction or after successfully doing probation do they see the benefits. It's akin to the realization that you learned the most from the strictest teacher, but only in hindsight and not at the time.

Q. What advice would you give to other jurisdictions that are considering trying HOPE Probation?

A. The results are amazing. I've been involved in nearly all of the probation department's major initiatives during my 28-year career, and this, by far, has been the most exciting and innovative. I see the positive impact it's had on clients and POs, and it fits in nicely with evidence-based practices.

Author Information

Angela Hawken, PhD is associate professor of economics and policy analysis at the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine University. She is from South Africa, where she taught undergraduate and graduate econometrics and microeconomics before moving to Los Angeles in 1998 to complete a PhD in policy analysis at the RAND Graduate School. She teaches graduate classes in research methods, statistics, applied methods for policy analysis, crime, and social policy. Her research interests are primarily in drugs, crime, and corruption. At RAND, she conducted research on early education, sentencing, and tort reform. Hawken conducted the statewide cost-benefit analysis of California's Proposition 36, and led the randomized controlled trial of Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE), a swift-and-certain-sanctions model to manage high-risk probationers. Drug Czar, Gil Kerlikowske, identified HOPE as the most promising initiative that "not only prevents recidivism, but also actively assists individuals to transition to productive lives."

Hawken consults regularly for the UN and the State Department. She advised a State Department-supported think tank in Georgia. She is developing measurement instruments to study corruption and gender issues in the Asia-Pacific region, for the UN regional office, and her work is featured regularly in the UN Human Development Reports. She has visited Afghanistan twice, and is co-author of the Afghanistan corruption-monitoring system used by the UN and State Department to track public-sector corruption. She is also working on counternarcotics policy for Afghanistan, for the State Department. Hawken actively includes students in fieldwork for her research and in writing projects. She involved a dozen School of Public Policy students in the HOPE evaluation, and has placed over two dozen students in international internships.

Conflict of Interest Statement

I declare that I have no proprietary, financial, professional or other personal interest of any nature or kind in any product, service and/or company that could be construed as influencing the position presented in, or the review of, the manuscript entitled: HOPE for Probation: How Hawaii improved behavior with high-probability, low-severity sanctions.

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20. The extent to which these effects persist after the testing and sanctions are no longer in effect has yet to be established and is currently being assessed as part of a separate recently-funded study conducted by the author